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Date of Formation – 15-19 April 2017 Members – UWSP/UWSA, KIO/KIA, SSPP/SSA, MNTJP/MNDAA, NDAA/ESS, PSLF/TNLA, ULA/AA Chairman (1) – Bao Youxiang (UWSP/UWSA) Chairman (2) – General N’Ban La (KIO/KIA) Secretary – Bao Yuri Although the FPNCC had a policy of all members engaging in a unified discussion through a path other than the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), two factions emerged within the FPNCC: those who oppose the military junta and those who do not. “Operation 1027,” led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, remains active and its forces are still actively fighting against the military junta. The alliances and joint operations with the revolutionary forces of the Spring Revolution are still underway. The Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), which holds the Chairman (2) position within the FPNCC, has a firm commitment to the National Unity Government (NUG). It is also playing a leading role in the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C) alongside other forces, which is a very important part of the military side of the Spring Revolution. On the other hand, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which holds the Chairman (1) position, along with the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), have not yet been able to reject the junta’s invitations and are still traveling to Nay Pyi Taw for meetings. As the conflicts widen, the member organizations of the FPNCC, which are striving to dismantle the military junta from their respective regions, often attempt to reduce conflicts among themselves through discussions and negotiations. However, disputes and friction remain at the ground level. The leadership of the FPNCC, which now includes both groups aiming to end the military dictatorship and groups that have not shifted from their original stance on regional stability, have been absent throughout the coup. The FPNCC is handling the pressure and coercion from the Chinese government very carefully. Furthermore, as each group within the FPNCC may be susceptible to the military junta’s divisive approaches and enticements, the future of the FPNCC remains something to watch. Reference: Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process – A Reference Guide (2024 – 2025) |