State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, unlawfully detained since the military coup, has become a bargaining chip in the hands of the military junta. While the junta has repeatedly claimed that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains in good health, no one has been able to confirm that she is still alive.
As a result, the people of Myanmar and the international community remain deeply concerned for her life and safety. This in itself shows that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has become one of the junta’s key bargaining chips. For its part, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which has had to navigate the post-coup period without Daw Aung San Suu Kyi since the coup, maintains that her participation is indispensable to resolving Myanmar’s post-coup political crisis and continues to call for her release.
This issue of BNI-Myanmar Peace Monitor’s Biweekly News Review examines how this card in the junta’s hands risks weakening the cohesion, unity, and mutual trust among resistance forces, and the various approaches centered on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Public Concerns over Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
Since her arrest on 1 February 2021, the junta has denied Daw Aung San Suu Kyi access to her legal team after 30 December 2022. The junta has also barred her legal team from speaking with domestic and international news media. Since January 2023, the junta has ignored, without ever once responding, all of the legal team’s repeated written requests for an in-person meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
As a result, the people of Myanmar and the international community including her son, Kim Aris (Ko Htein Lin) remain deeply worried about the 81-year-old Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s safety and well-being. “Proof of Life” campaigns demanding evidence that she is alive have gained significant momentum both in Myanmar and around the world.
The release of all detained prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has been the unwavering demand of the people of Myanmar and the broader resistance since the very start of the coup.
Over the five years since the coup, central Myanmar has faced a succession of disasters – multiple COVID-19 waves, the magnitude-7.7 Sagaing earthquake, and flooding, among others. Given this, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s safety and well being inside a prison in Nay Pyi Taw, the junta’s seat of power, remain a matter of grave concern.
The Junta’s Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Card
From early dawn of 1 February 2021, when the coup began, the junta indiscriminately hunted down and arrested politicians, writers, and artists alike anyone who might come to oppose the takeover filing various trumped-up charges against them and handing down lengthy prison sentences. NLD leaders, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, alongside cabinet members, were arrested simultaneously. Ostracized on the international stage throughout the post-coup period, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has served as one of the junta’s key bargaining chips.
On 12 July 2023, ahead of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, reports emerged that Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai had been allowed to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi inside her prison in Nay Pyi Taw. The claim, which first surfaced via the US-based outlet PanOrient News stating the meeting had taken place on 9 July that year, also alleged that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did not recognize the NUG-affiliated People’s Defense Forces (PDF) or the National Unity Government (NUG) itself. Thai Foreign Minister Mr. Don also commented briefly, stating, “I met her. She is in good health.” 1
On 12 July 2026, at an informal meeting in Bangkok between ASEAN foreign ministers and the Myanmar junta’s foreign minister, arranged by the Thai government, junta representative U Tin Maung Swe reportedly said that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was alive and well and was being looked after “like a relative, like an elder sister. ” Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow also told the Bangkok Post that he hoped the Myanmar junta would allow a meeting between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ASEAN’s special envoy, Philippine Foreign Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro.
On 21 July, speaking with AFP, he remarked: “Wouldn’t it be a form of progress if the Myanmar junta allowed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to meet with the ASEAN special envoy?” putting this forward as a factor to weigh when assessing the junta’s implementation of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.
In reality, however, on 19 June 2026 – marking Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s 81st birthday – the junta arrested no fewer than 20 local residents in Mandalay, Monywa, and Taunggyi who took part in rose campaigns held in her honor.
The NLD’s Approach to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release
On 20 July 2026, National League for Democracy (NLD) Statement No. 04/2026 drew considerable criticism from anti-junta resistance forces. In particular, instead of the phrase “building a federal democratic union” used in common by all forces within the Spring Revolution, the statement reverted to the term used before the coup “building a democratic federal union.”
Viewed in this light, the move reflects the NLD’s leadership vacuum through more than five years of the coup and its inability to take the lead on any matter without Daw Aung San Suu Kyi leaving the party largely on the sidelines as the junta continues to act.
Viewed in this light, the move reflects the NLD’s leadership vacuum through more than five years of the coup and its inability to take the lead on any matter without Daw Aung San Suu Kyi – leaving the party largely on the sidelines as the junta continues to act.
The NLD believes that continuing to uphold ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus so as to prevent a military-led transitional government established through a sham election from reaching a stage of recognition would help resolve Myanmar’s conflict. The party contends that only by creating an environment in which political leaders and forces, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, are free to participate can Myanmar’s conflict be resolved more quickly.
The NLD maintains that political problems must be resolved solely through political means, has consistently adhered to a policy of seeking solutions through dialogue, and has made clear that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation is indispensable to resolving the post-coup political crisis.
Viewed against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership and the NLD’s more than five years of separation from her, the 20 July statement makes clear that the involvement of NLD members and leadership figures within the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) – formed of MPs elected in 2020 – and within the National Unity Government (NUG), in which a majority of NLD MPs take part, does not necessarily reflect official NLD policy or positions.
Consequently, the NLD’s stance and policies appear ambiguous within the Spring Revolution forces, which are driving toward ending the military dictatorship and building a Federal Democratic Union.
Analysis
While many share deep concern for 81-year-old State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the nature of that concern varies. The concern of her son, Kim Aris (Ko Htein Lin), will differ from that of the public, who cherish her as the mother of the nation and as national leader; from that of the NLD party; and from that of international governments and organizations.
However, for the junta, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi serves as serves as one of the junta’s key political bargaining chips. They want to use her name to regain acceptance within the international community. It should be noted that the junta’s statements claiming she is healthy and well cared for are pure propaganda. Just as the junta’s refusal to let even her own son, Kim Aris (Ko Htein Lin), see her should be weighed, so too must serious weight be given to the fact that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has not even been granted a meeting with her own legal team.
At the same time, the scale and intensity of the armed conflict that has unfolded over more than five years of the coup, the shifting political dynamics, and the positions taken by international governments have all become factors to weigh – and these also raise questions about the NLD’s approach of insisting that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation is indispensable to resolving the post-coup crisis.
Ultimately, whenever the military junta encounters difficulty or crisis in making its coup succeed, it resorts to its usual escape routes. Revolutionary forces must therefore exercise caution to ensure that the ‘Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Card’ played by the junta does not turn into a curse that undermines cohesion, unity, and trust among those striving to end the military dictatorship and build a Federal Democratic Union. Likewise, regional countries and ASEAN as a bloc should not hastily regard merely granting access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as progress toward implementing the Five-Point Consensus. The junta’s opportunistic use of the “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Card” could even deepen divisions among ASEAN member states, and should therefore be approached with the utmost caution.
1. Conflicting Messages from Mr. Don, PanOrient, and the Myanmar’s Military Council, Issue – 112, 11 Jul 2023, BNI-MPM