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“They attacked Lashio, seized control, but then what? Did they even have a plan to hold it? They stormed in, and now the people are fleeing. They’re suffering from the war, and on top of that, they’re being looted. The residents of Lashio have been through hell, trapped and forced to endure it all. – A resident of Lashio

An interview with a Lashio resident on the MNDAA’s eight-month control of Lashio, the headquarters of the Northeastern Command, and its impending return to the military council by late April

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang army), which had controlled Lashio over eight months, is now preparing to withdraw from the town in northern Shan State.

Local residents report that, due to pressure from China, the MNDAA has been given until 17 April2025—the first day of the Myanmar New Year following the Thingyan Festival—to complete its withdrawal.

On 22 March, the military junta and the MNDAA held talks in Kunming, China, facilitated by Chinese mediators. Although rumors circulated that no agreement was reached, it has now emerged that the MNDAA will retreat from Lashio after the Thingyan period.

Meanwhile, since early March, a significant number of Kokang troops, fully armed, have been marching toward Theinni town, fueling local concerns that the MNDAA might withdraw from Lashio in batches before June, as previously rumored.

The MNDAA, alongside allied forces, first attacked and captured Lashio in the first week of August 2024, maintaining control for over eight months. Now, as the situation unfolds toward the end of April 2025, with the junta poised to retake the town, Shan News conducted this interview with a Lashio resident about the developments.

Caption – Lashio General Hospital under the MNDAA’s administration

Q: What is the situation regarding the MNDAA’s withdrawal from Lashio? Could you also describe the current situation in Lashio?

A: As for now, I can tell you that the MNDAA’s withdrawal from Lashio is pretty much 100 percent certain. It’s almost confirmed, you could say. From what we’ve heard, the military council will first bring in its civilian administration—basically, the governance structures. Departments like immigration, education, and health will start moving in and taking up positions. The military council’s administrative mechanisms will start operating again. But even though that’s the case, we’ve also heard that this will only apply to Wards 1 through 12. In other words, just the residential areas in the town itself. The outskirts, everything outside those wards, will still be controlled by the MNDAA, from what we’re hearing.

The reason for this, based on what we’ve heard—though they haven’t arrived yet, this is just the rumor—is that there is Ho Peik in the direction of Hseni; Battalion 68 in the direction of Mong Yaw; Man Aing in the direction of Ward 5; and past Mae Han in the direction of Hsipaw
Thipaw toward Mayhan; and the detour of Ei Naing in the direction of Namtu—all those areas will still be held by the MNDAA. That’s what we’re hearing. So, from what we can see, the military council will come back in, but they’ll only be setting up in Wards 1 to 12, the residential parts of town.

Another thing is that the MNDAA will still keep a liaison office in Lashio. We’ve also heard that China plans to establish a consulate here. On top of that, there’s talk online about the ‘Wa’ group and China—or maybe the military council—working together on healthcare initiatives, but that’s just circulating online; nothing’s confirmed. And then there’s the military council—they’ll come in with some numbers, but it won’t be like before when they had the big Northeastern Command headquarters here. That’s what we’ve been hearing consistently. We can confirm they’re coming back, but as for how they’ll position themselves once they return, we’ll only know for sure once they actually arrive.

Q: There’s talk that the MNDAA is handing Lashio back to the military council due to pressure from China, and that if they don’t, there’s a fear of renewed airstrikes. What might be the real reasons behind the MNDAA having to return Lashio to the military council?

A: Well, here’s how I see it as a regular citizen. Some might accept the idea that they’re withdrawing because of Chinese pressure or the fear of airstrikes, but there’s also a part of us, as ordinary people, who don’t buy that explanation. For us, the people, it doesn’t really matter who governs—whether it’s the military council or the Kokang forces. We just want whoever’s in charge to treat the people fairly and justly. We don’t have the right to say, “This group should govern, not that one.” We can’t just wave someone in or out. The people are like bees—we have to settle for whichever flower blooms. We can’t say, “Let this flower bloom, not that one.” But going back to what you mentioned about Chinese pressure and the fear of airstrikes—why didn’t they know this from the start? That’s what I want to ask. I was born and raised here in northern Shan State, a native boy through and through. Since the day I was born, I’ve seen these ethnic armed groups, I’ve seen it all. People like us, born in these mountainous areas, have been living amidst conflict for 70 years.

For 70 years, we’ve been caught in the middle of these armed conflicts, trading rice for oil, oil for rice (meaning you have to give to get). We’ve lived through it all, seen it with our own eyes. The fact that they can’t resist Chinese pressure isn’t something new that started with this “Operation 1027” or the battle to take Lashio. Even back in the day, no armed group has ever been able to go against China. And the idea that the military has planes to bomb with—that’s not news either. They’ve known that for a long time. What I’m trying to say is, if it’s not feasible, don’t do it. But if you’re going to do it, go all the way. The ideas here is that they attacked Lashio, and the people of Lashio had to flee as much as they could. First point: if China was going to pressure them, why didn’t they think about how to handle or avoid that pressure before acting? Second point: they already knew the military junta would bomb with planes. If they knew that, why did they attack without any air defense measures in place? What I’m getting at is, making excuses like this doesn’t sit right. The people of Lashio are being used as pawns in their political games, their political gambling.

Those who died, died; those who were injured, were injured. Homes were destroyed, burned down. Some people, living as displaced people, have fallen into poverty. Others, displaced to different areas, are living in tears, facing all kinds of hardships. Some even died as displaced people due to floods or earthquakes. These are real things the people have had to endure. And now, after all this, they turn around and say, “Oh, China pressured us,” or “The military bombed us with planes.” They should have known that from the beginning! Why didn’t they prepare for what was obviously going to happen? Why did they put the people through this suffering? If it was going to turn out like this, why didn’t they think it through beforehand? They attacked Lashio, seized control, but then what? Did they even have a plan to hold it? They stormed in, and now the people are fleeing. They’re suffering from the war, and on top of that, they’re being looted. The residents of Lashio have been through hell, trapped and forced to endure it all.

Q: During the negotiations between the military council and the Kokang army, what kind of guarantees would you want to demand for the people?

A: Let me tell you what we’d want to demand. First off, the military council is coming back in, and the MNDAA is pulling out. Right now, we’re talking about Wards 1 through 12. Some people, because of the MNDAA’s presence, struggled to make ends meet. So they had to work under the MNDAA—taking up jobs as staff in various sectors. There are healthcare workers, security personnel, EPC staff, you name it—across all kinds of departments. These are people who took these jobs because they had no other way to survive economically, to put food on the table. On top of that, the administrators who used to serve our communities—ward leaders, area officers, hundred-household heads—many of them have fled as displaced people.

Now, with the people who are left, there’s this sense of, “If we don’t take care of our own community, who will?” So, whether they wanted to or not, some stepped up to become ward administrators or hundred-household heads. But what kind of guarantees are there for these people? How will they be supported? These things really matter. Then there are the CDM [Civil Disobedience Movement] teachers who came back and started working again. What’s going to happen to them? It can’t just be a case of the MNDAA walking away. I don’t think that’s the right way to handle this. If they do it that way, I believe the MNDAA will completely die out in the history of politics down the road. Honestly, we already see them as half-dead politically.

Q: For the CDM workers, administrative staff, and security personnel who worked alongside the MNDAA in Lashio’s reconstruction efforts, what should they do when the military council returns? For example, should they stay in the town, or should they follow the MNDAA to other areas under their control?

A: From what we’ve heard, “If you want to follow them, go ahead.” That’s what people are saying. But for some folks, following them just isn’t practical. Because the people aren’t homeless or without roots. They’ve got their homes, their belongings, right here in this town. They can’t just leave all that behind and go—it’s not that simple. Everyone’s got their own house, their family, their roots here. So, following them just doesn’t work for most.
What we want is this: whatever guarantees have been promised, make them happen. Don’t let the military council cause trouble for the people who helped us. Don’t call them in for questioning or arrest them. All of this should come with clear commitments—that’s how I think it ought to be.

Q: With the MNDAA set to withdraw, essential public services like healthcare and education are at risk of shutting down again. These services were in place before the MNDAA took over, and during the reconstruction period, they had started to regain strength. Now, as the MNDAA prepares to leave, how will the people of Lashio cope with these challenges and overcome them?

A: Talking about this issue is really tough, and it’s honestly pretty heartbreaking. Here’s why: from what we know, the MNDAA is leaving Lashio with just a shell of what was here. Take healthcare, for example—the Lashio General Hospital isn’t something the military council alone owns. The equipment in a people’s hospital belongs to the public, which is exactly why it’s called a people’s hospital. What’s in there? There are supplies donated by NGOs. Back in 2010–2011, the Japanese came and built facilities, providing equipment with Japanese technology—stuff worth hundreds of millions [of kyats], even billions. Some patients, after being treated and recovering, donated whatever equipment they could afford as a thank-you. Then there are private individuals or organizations who’ve donated supplies too. That’s why, when you look at it as a whole, it’s called a people’s hospital.

But now, the MNDAA has taken a lot of that stuff with them, showing no compassion for the people. What we’re saying is, if it’s equipment for their military hospitals, fine, take it—no problem. That’s just stuff they used for their soldiers during the fighting. But now they’re even taking school supplies—printers, computers, everything. On top of that, they’re taking electrical cables. At the EPC they’ve taken meter boxes, transformers, and more cables. They’ve even argued among themselves over this stuff. Some locals begged them, “Please don’t take everything, leave something behind for us,” and that’s led to arguments too. When you look at all this, what do you see? Once the MNDAA leaves, the people of Lashio are going to be in real trouble. Because the military council has never, ever shown any genuine care for the people.

When they come back, if they have three pills, they’ll give you three pills—that’s it. Once those are gone, they won’t care anymore. If there’s a basic X-ray machine, they’ll use that to take your X-ray, but something critical like a TB X-ray? They won’t be able to do it. With the equipment gone, they’ll just work with whatever’s left, and they’re not going to buy new stuff to help the people—they don’t have that kind of goodwill. They didn’t have it before, and they definitely won’t have it going forward. So, on one side, you’ve got the military council with no compassion, and on the other, the MNDAA is taking all the equipment with them. That means the people are going to face serious healthcare struggles down the line.

The MNDAA shouldn’t do these things at all. They believe they’re fighting the military council, not the people. They consider the people not their enemies. But, now that they’re taking all the people’s property, I want to ask if they have no goodwill toward the people.

Q: With the MNDAA withdrawing from Lashio, what might the political and military landscape of northern Shan State look like moving forward?

A: Let me share my perspective. In the villages and rural areas, there were never any armed groups before. But in the four years since the coup, things have changed. After the coup, a parallel government, the NUG, emerged. Then the PDFs came along. Once they appeared, we started seeing battles we never could’ve imagined in our lifetime. Battles broke out in unexpected places. Looking at this, you’ve got what’s considered the government—whether you recognize it or not—that’s Min Aung Hlaing’s military council. But then, alongside it, the NUG came up as a parallel government. Countries around Myanmar, like India, Thailand, other ASEAN nations, as well as the UN, China, and the U.S., are all watching closely to see what happens. While they were observing, “Operation 1027” came in waves—first wave, second wave— their true colors began to emerge suddenly.

How did it happen? You had the big dictator and all these smaller dictators splintering into fragments. The NUG calls itself a parallel government, but forget about uniting other ethnic armed groups—some of the PDFs they created are under their control, but a lot of them aren’t. They don’t follow the NUG’s authority. Other countries are watching this too. These groups fight among themselves, they compete for power. Some are abroad, collecting money, filling their pockets, calling it fundraising or whatever. If you look at the ethnic armed groups, I’d say the most successful resistance groups are right here in northern Shan State with “Operation 1027,” the first and second waves. Back then, they were saying they’d take Naypyidaw, Yangon, that they’d uproot the dictatorship, pull it out by the roots. They fought with those big promises.

But forget about the whole country, or even all of Shan State—in northern Shan State alone, places like Muse, Nam Lan, Mongyai, and Tangyan are still out of their control. On top of that, some Shan groups have been driven out. Shan people have had to flee, piling into cars to escape. And do the Kokang and Palaung get along? No—there have been clashes, violent fights. Just recently in Kutkai, they fought so brutally that people died in gruesome ways. The Kachin and Palaung have clashed too. If this is the pattern, what will neighboring countries think? The NUG can’t control things. If Min Aung Hlaing’s regime collapses, will the war in Myanmar stop? With this pattern, it could actually get worse—they’ve seen that already. Now Min Aung Hlaing is even attending meetings in Thailand. If this continues, he might even get a seat at ASEAN.

The ethnic armed groups, the PDFs, the NUG—there’s so much dysfunction in this revolution, so many things that don’t add up, so much disunity. On top of that, in the first and second waves of the “Operation 1027,” there was a lot of dishonesty. If they had been truly honest, with all the groups in eastern, southern, and northern Shan State—the Wa, the Shan, RCSS, SSPP, Palaung, Kokang, Pa-O, Lahu—if they had all come together and fought as one, they wouldn’t even need the PDFs to join in. The PDFs could fight in the lowlands, and the armed groups already in Shan State could handle the rest—they’d win everything. But because they weren’t honest, because one group didn’t trust the other, after 70 years of dodging and weaving through conflict, if things don’t align, this is how it’ll keep going.

Q: Is there anything else you’d like to add?

A: If all the armed groups really want to come together and defeat the military junta, they shouldn’t do it this way. If they keep going like this, they’ll never win. Why? Because they’re not honest with each other. They’re driven by greed. They need to think about the whole country. If they keep prioritizing their own state, their own special region, their own power, their own economic success—if that’s all they focus on—then they’ll just keep dodging and weaving like this, stuck in the same cycle. That’s what I’d like to add.

Sent by Shan News.