An interview with Salai Dokha, a political analyst and founder of India for Myanmar, on the political differences and divisions within the Chin resistance forces.
More than three years after the Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, the Chin revolutionary forces have achieved some military successes, but political differences have grown more severe, leading to warnings and even clashes on the ground.
If this situation continues, what will become of the future Chinland that the Chin people aspire to? How should we proceed to prevent further divisions between the current Chin revolutionary groups? To find out more about these issues, Khonumthung Media Group (KMG) conducted this interview with Salai Dokha, a young Chin political analyst and founder of India for Myanmar.
Q: It has been over three years since the armed revolution against the military dictatorship began in Chin State, including mainland Myanmar. To what extent have the Chin revolutionary forces made progress during this period?
A: In terms of Chin politics, there has been some military success over the past three years. However, due to the recent political disagreements, it has become difficult to manage the military achievements in the administrative sphere due to differing views and territorial disputes. There is now a lack of unity in leveraging the revolutionary gains together. While military results are progressing, the ultimate desired political outcome remains far off.
From this point, it is crucial to establish common political goals to minimize disagreements. At the very least, we need to systematically set goals that prevent conflict and serious political confrontation. If we fail to do so and focus solely on military progress, it could lead to a loss of trust and clashes between resistance forces and seriously undermine efforts to rebuild the nation, just as the trust between us and the military junta was broken over 70 years ago.
Q: In these three years, are you satisfied with the Chin people’s participation and support for the revolution? How would you assess it?
A: The people of Chin State, like the people of Myanmar as a whole, have participated almost 100 per cent in the current revolution. Their participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) to cripple the military junta’s machinery has been tremendously strong. Previously, systematic tax payments were rare among the Chin people and across the country. But now, people are contributing funds under the banners of “tax” or “donation” in support of the revolution in many places. Rather than asking people to participate, we have reached a point where the resistance forces need to show tangible results to the people.
This is something that the leaders must take into account. In this situation, the revolutionary leaders need to step up their efforts. The people are currently full of worries. They can’t cooperate with the military council at all. When they turn to the resistance forces, they also have concerns, especially as frictions between them increase. To address these concerns, the resistance forces need to be able to show concrete achievements in the areas under their control. They need to prove that through the revolution, they are able to achieve the best possible results in a united manner. I would like to say that the people have fully shouldered their responsibilities.
Q: If we look at the current state of the Chin revolution, we can say there is some military success, but why are there political divisions and splits happening?
A: First, there is a lack of shared understanding of the meaning of the revolution itself. One group views revolutionary success solely through the lens of military victory. Another view links the revolution to the results of the 2020 elections. How the revolutionary context itself is perceived is the first problem. This needs to be negotiated. Since a revolution implies systemic changes, there must some give and take with regard to systemic issues.
Secondly, I believe the actions deviating from the “people’s revolution” have caused significant problems within the Chin community. Once a “people’s revolution” is labelled as such, no single group or individual can claim ownership over its results – these should benefit the entire population. While this idea is accepted in theory, there is a lack of realization of a true “people’s revolution” in practice, not just among the Chin people, but nationwide.
Thirdly, there is no consensus on the ultimate goal. Some want a confederate system, others want a federal system. Some are still undecided. Our goals are different and it will extremely difficult to reconcile them all. In my opinion, the main reason for our divisions is that we are unable to find a common revolutionary goal, even if it requires compromises. The lack of a unified political goal has led to problems in forming alliances and coordinating efforts.
Lastly, I must openly say that those leading the revolution seem to lack sincere political will. If one is only concerned with what benefits oneself or one’s own group, then there is a lack of genuine commitment to the national cause. Whether one settles for the Chinland Council’s approach or the ICNCC’s, such factionalization reveals a glaring lack of political goodwill and problem-solving at an individual leadership level.
Q: What kind of political landscape do the Chin people aspire to? How do they envision Chin State?
A: Before the Chinland Council was convened, I traveled a lot and talked to many Chin people. They want a revolutionary interim government that quickly replaces the military junta’s administration and address the people’s hardships. They want a situation in which the current revenues, resources, international aid and public contributions of various groups are pooled and systematically managed during this revolutionary period. Through mutual coordination, political cooperation in some areas, sharing of resources in others and financial cooperation in others, 70-80% of the problems could be solved.
At present, the Chin people primarily want to expel the military regime and have their needs systematically addressed. If they focus solely on the wishes of the people, I believe that the existing Chin armed forces are capable of fully satisfying the wishes of the people. If they want to capture towns together, they have enough strength. But because of the current division, it’s as if we don’t have enough weapons. If we go our separate ways, it will not lead to success.
Q: The PDF-Zoland has warned the joint forces led by the CNA not to try to take the town of Tedim, and any incursion into their area of control will be met with an armed confrontation. How would this lack of coordination and the warning not to invade each other’s territory affect the revolution?
A: In the current situation, one can’t entirely blame the one who makes this statement. Take the burning of Thantlang town for example: there was no military camp in Thantlang, only a police station. When reports came out that the Lunglang police station was to be captured, fighting broke out. The junta then launched an offensive on Thantlang via Hakha. When I asked insiders why they did not prevent this offensive, the local defense forces replied: “Our area did not need military reinforcements. They don’t need to come as long as we don’t call them.”
At first, they managed to stop the military column of about 70 men. But when the reinforcements arrived, they could no longer stop them. When the military entered the town of Thantlang, firefights broke out, which eventually led to the town being burned to the ground.
If we were to blame each other for the burning of Thantlang, I must say that it was largely due to the negligence of the resistance forces. The military council is the one who burned down the town; we were the one who was negligent. Whether it is military strategy or politics, we should have worked together. This situation caused us to lose Thantlang. The people of Thantlang did not want to accept that their town was set on fire during clashes between the local defense forces and the military junta. They had to reluctantly accept that the fire was an unintended consequence. However, in places like Mindat, Tedim, Kanpetlet and Falam, any military operation must take into account the possible collateral damage that the civilian population can endure.
Otherwise, the Chin forces themselves could suffer even more in dealing with the consequences. The statement points to the first consequence of the collapse of the CJDC, followed by the complete political split into the ICNCC and CC camps. The third problem, as the Thantlang case has shown, is the lack of accountability when unilateral actions without local defense forces and broader coordination lead to disastrous consequences. Getting it right is crucial. Focusing solely on military matters while ignoring the potential political repercussions could seriously undermine trust between us and seriously affect Chin’s future politics.
Q: What would be the solution or the way forward to find common ground and reunite the divided Chinland Council and the ICNCC? How should they start?
A: At this stage, they should avoid any actions that further undermine trust. Instead, they should take steps to build trust. I would say that the situation has reached an unsustainable level of tension since the collapse of the Chinland Joint Defense Committee (CJDC) and the subsequent political split in the Chin forces. If we don’t prioritize political affairs now, we may not achieve the revolutionary result we seek. We need harmony between political and military affairs. In some groups like the Arakan (Rakhine), the military and political wings are working separately. But the Chin situation can’t be compared with that of the Arakan or Karen.
Each Chin armed group has a population of nearly a hundred thousand people, controls its territory and is based on its own literary, cultural and traditional foundations. To deny these groups a political role is essentially to alienate them and their people. Thus, the military front may go in a certain direction, but political reunification could easily leave some ethnic groups behind. Such a lack of military and political coordination between Chin forces could lead to many unexpected shifts.
Therefore, the Chinland Council and the ICNCC must first reunify themselves. To this end, I would suggest developing a clear political roadmap from the beginning. They need to use the common political vision as a guiding framework to then facilitate monthly dialogue between the ICNCC and CC camps and between the defense forces on military issues. Such unwavering mutual commitment to the roadmap would strengthen trust between all sides before a final structure for reunification can be formed. Ultimately, everything depends on maintaining this process of engagement.
Q: The Arakan Army (AA) is carrying out administrative functions in Paletwa Township in Chin State. In order to enter and leave Paletwa, locals need permission from the AA. What is your view on this situation?
A: The Paletwa issue, like many others, shows our various weaknesses and negligence. Secondly, as far as Paletwa is concerned, we have not been able to unite. On the AA side, they haven’t said anything like Paletwa is part of Arakan State, nor would we definitely accept it if they did. Their present administrative role can be seen as a situation that needs a future resolution. And, for the Paletwa context, the Arakanese side needs to be prudent. An armed confrontation between Arakan and Chin in Paletwa would only further harm the AA. I believe if the Chin can remain united, the right solution will emerge.
Thirdly, I don’t think either side should use the situation in Paletwa to provoke a conflict between the Chin and the Arakanese. India would also disapprove of this. Not taking important players like India and China into account could put us at a further disadvantage. Paletwa can be used as a temporary route for the Arakanese liberation struggle or as resistance to the junta’s four-cut tactics. As fellow resistance groups, we understand this.
Now, if young Chin Lawngtlai activists block this key route on the Indian side, it is the Arakanese people who will suffer. My point is that the Arakan can’t act at their own will regarding Paletwa. If they do, they will only harm themselves. In this context, the Chin should remain united and work towards an amicable historic transfer of authority arrangement with the Arakan.
I am not too worried about Paletwa itself. What I want to convey is that the Chin are facing such problems not only in Paletwa but also in other areas. I recommend a quick solution through unity.
Q: What else would you like to add?
A: There is something to pay attention to. As Chin people, we should not make each other suffer. We should not make each other sad. Because there are many differences between us in terms of religion, culture and traditions. In our revolutionary situation, we have worked together with people of all races. Our greatest wish is that what has happened again and again in history should not be repeated, that equality should prevail. We need to treat each other as equals on human level.
This has been an exemplary endeavor of the Chin people. If we don’t uphold this exemplary spirit, the geopolitical map of Chin may change drastically, as I mentioned earlier. Because in a new political system, a single ethnic group need not confine itself to a single state. So I’d like to urge the people at home and abroad as well as the revolutionary leaders to refrain from words and actions that promote hostility and subjugation among us.
Sent from KMG.